PPRIV(1) | User Commands | PPRIV(1) |
ppriv - inspect or modify process privilege sets and attributes
/usr/bin/ppriv -e [-D | -N] [-M] [-s spec] command [arg]...
/usr/bin/ppriv [-v] [-S] [-D | -N] [-s spec]
[pid | core]...
/usr/bin/ppriv -l [-v] [privilege-specification]...
The first invocation of the ppriv command runs the command specified with the privilege sets and flags modified according to the arguments on the command line.
The second invocation examines or changes the privilege state of running process and core files.
The third invocation lists the privileges defined and information about specified privileges or privileges set specifications.
The following options are supported:
-D
-e
-l
-M
A process with these attributes and the net_mac_aware privilege can communicate with lower-level remote peers.
-N
-s spec
AEILP
+-=
privsetspec
Modifying the same set with multiple -s options is possible as long as there is either precisely one assignment to an individual set or any number of additions and removals. That is, assignment and addition or removal for one set are mutually exclusive.
-S
-v
The ppriv utility examines processes and core files and prints or changes their privilege sets.
ppriv can run commands with privilege debugging on or off or with fewer privileges than the invoking process.
When executing a sub process, the only sets that can be modified are L and I. Privileges can only be removed from L and I as ppriv starts with P=E=I.
ppriv can also be used to remove privileges from processes or to convey privileges to other processes. In order to control a process, the effective set of the ppriv utility must be a super set of the controlled process's E, I, and P. The utility's limit set must be a super set of the target's limit set. If the target's process uids do not match, the {PRIV_PROC_OWNER} privilege must be asserted in the utility's effective set. If the controlled processes have any uid with the value 0, more restrictions might exist. See privileges(7).
Example 1 Obtaining the Process Privileges of the Current Shell
The following example obtains the process privileges of the current shell:
example$ ppriv $$ 387: -sh flags = <none>
E: basic
I: basic
P: basic
L: all
Example 2 Removing a Privilege From Your Shell's Inheritable and Effective Set
The following example removes a privilege from your shell's inheritable and effective set.
example$ ppriv -s EI-proc_session $$
The subprocess can still inspect the parent shell but it can no longer influence the parent because the parent has more privileges in its Permitted set than the ppriv child process:
example$ truss -p $$ truss: permission denied: 387 example$ ppriv $$ 387: -sh flags = <none>
E: basic,!proc_session
I: basic,!proc_session
P: basic
L: all
Example 3 Running a Process with Privilege Debugging
The following example runs a process with privilege debugging:
example$ ppriv -e -D cat /etc/shadow cat[418]: missing privilege "file_dac_read" (euid = 21782),
needed at ufs_access+0x3c cat: cannot open /etc/shadow
The privilege debugging error messages are sent to the controlling terminal of the current process. The needed at address specification is an artifact of the kernel implementation and it can be changed at any time after a software update.
The system call number can be mapped to a system call using /etc/name_to_sysnum.
Example 4 Listing the Privileges Available in the Current Zone
The following example lists the privileges available in the current zone (see zones(7)). When run in the global zone, all defined privileges are listed.
example$ ppriv -l zone
... listing of all privileges elided ...
Example 5 Examining a Privilege Aware Process
The following example examines a privilege aware process:
example$ ppriv -S `pgrep rpcbind` 928: /usr/sbin/rpcbind flags = PRIV_AWARE
E: net_privaddr,proc_fork,sys_nfs
I: none
P: net_privaddr,proc_fork,sys_nfs
L: none
See setpflags(2) for explanations of the flags.
The following exit values are returned:
0
non-zero
/proc/*
/etc/name_to_sysnum
See attributes(7) for descriptions of the following attributes:
ATTRIBUTE TYPE | ATTRIBUTE VALUE |
Interface Stability | See below. |
The invocation is Committed. The output is Uncommitted.
gcore(1), truss(1), setpflags(2), priv_str_to_set(3C), proc(5), attributes(7), privileges(7), zones(7)
February 24, 2008 | OmniOS |